Academic apartheid is very similar to the notion of Environmental Apartheid (most of the lit. came out with Kyoto Protocol). Essentially it morphs the ad ignorantiam fallacy (appeal to ignorance) into a Bio-Politcal separation. Academia (in this case-science) isolates itself and eliminates access, thus pushing "others" to the borders. Apartheid isolated to the US academics. Habermas never as far as I do with the apartheid analogy, but he positioned most of western academia as isolated and ill-fated to the public. M. Noussbam makes similar criticisms of Cultural or American feminism (see J. Butler). We isolate, publish, research. . . and push "others" into separate spaces.

I see. So according to the supposition of "Academic apartheid", those people in academia don't want to share with others - perhaps not with "common" people? So they jealously guard their knowledge?

Or is it that Academics guard against some sort of knowledge "intrusion" by those people who they deem to be unqualified - in other words, a "commoner" idea won't be accepted as mainstream knowledge by those in academia?

Do I have it right?

Your second does occur. . .but it's not what I'm refering to. My position is grounded in infrastrucuture within the field itself. When "american science" positions itself "above" other forms/regions of science, it isolates and creates a structure that "others" don't have access or membership within. This could be based on capital, political identities and even in some cases. . religion.

When you remove others as "commoner" or "intrusive" ideologies and put them outside your infrastructure. . . . apartheid. Now input Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies and you have a huge mess :0

Guardianship of validated and "qualified" conclusions or fine. . .but when the infrastructure becomes isolated or even cyclical based on membership and rules. . .problems.

I guess I still don't understand. What forms of science are being excluded from "American Science"? What "others" don't have access to science in America?

Which scientific ideas are "intrusive" and being kept from mainstream science?

And who are the "guardians" of science? The professors teaching freshman physics? The department chairs in the university? The deans?

What is missing that they should be teaching?

Since I have no understanding of science, I am unqualified to comment on this, but as far as I can tell, there is no such thing as "American Science" as far as science itself is concerned, but if what Plotinus meant by that was the certain theories or hypotheses that are American in origin, then I can see what Plotinus meant. But insofar as science itself goes....by that line of reasoning, then there could be such things as Greek Math or Russian Math. But there aren't. Math is the language of the universe, and math is also the language of science. 2 + 2 is always going to equal 4, no matter where you are. It seems that Plotinus is skeptical of scientists. Hopefully you know that evolution is a proven fact, Plotinus? Perhaps what it was that you were talking about was the supposed majority of scientists who are atheists, compared to the ones who are theists. Even if there are more atheistic scientists worldwide, it isn't stopping some scientists from practicing their respective religions. Some pseudo-scientists out there may allow their religious dogma to get in the way of their thinking, but if a person is a REAL scientist, then they're not going to allow such things to interfere.

One of the problems that the religious seem to have with "academics" is that there is a clear correlation between the amount of education a person receives, and their tendency to be atheistic. As a person attains higher levels of education, especially in the sciences, they tend to be less religious.

Religious people are understandably concerned about this trend. It seems to be more evidence that leads to the conclusion that science and religion are mutually exclusive. Especially when you consider that from a fundamentally religious perspective some scientific discoveries cannot be held to be true due to the way they conflict with religious dogma.

I am trying to unravel what happened in this discussion after Plotinus made this remark:



In a later comment, Plotinus explained "academic apartheid" like this:



I may be missing the point--and I welcome correction if I am--but, based on those four sentences, I would re-state Plotinus' argument as follows: Science, as an autonomous, sovereign field, has adopted a universal premise that observed phenomena were not caused by a deity, and this is evidence that science is isolating itself and eliminating access to others, who wish to do science without adopting that premise.

If that is the argument, then I think it can be stated more simply: By accepting only naturalistic explanations for all observed phenomena, science unfairly excludes those who would incorporate supernatural explanations into scientific research.

(Please note that by re-stating Plotinus' argument in my own words, my intent is not to create a straw man through mischaracterization, but to ensure that we are indeed talking about the same things.)

Assuming I have correctly understood Plotinus' argument, then I think the phrase "academic apartheid" is not helpful. First, it carries distracting emotional baggage. Most people associate "apartheid" with race relations in South Africa, which is a deeply emotional topic. Carrying that emotion into a discussion about the validity of the scientific method (and that is what I think this is) only clouds the issue.

Second, using the word "apartheid" seems to me like a sneaky attempt to bring the science-is-just-religion-in-another-form argument in through the back door. At the very least, it is a table-turning argument that, in my opinion, does not hold up to scrutiny. Plotinus appears to be using the word "apartheid" to describe an alleged error in the scientific method (specifically, alleged philosophical naturalism). Knowing that science, like every other system of knowledge, including religion, has certain premises, Plotinus appears to be arguing that scientists have no basis for the premise of naturalism except for mere social construction, which we all know can be deconstructed. Or, stated another way, "You scientists have no reason to assume naturalism, so why not accept people who assume supernaturalism (i.e., religious people), too?" Thus, science is portrayed to have an equal footing with religion and the tables, Plotinus appears to believe, have been turned.

But now, having shed what I see as the confusing language of Plotinus' argument, we find ourselves in familiar territory after all: science, as a system for fashioning explanations of observed phenomena, is a method not an "autonomous, sovereign" entity, and it involves methdological naturalism, not philosophical naturalism (i.e., there is no "universal premise of anti-deification"). Religious explanations of observed phenomena, on the other hand, require both methodological and philosophical supernaturalism--also known in some (but not all) quarters as simply "theology."

Moreover, academia in general, both in the United States and elsewhere, does not exclude religious approaches; those approaches are simply not included in research that is called "scientific," which more accurately ought to be called "methodologically naturalistic"--but that's not catchy enough.

The fact that people (among them Plotinus, I think) want methodological and philosophical supernaturalism to be included under the banner of "science" is evidence of a different problem of social construction, which is the popular belief that calling something "scientific" makes it better or more reliable. In my view, people who want to include theology into science are covertly conceding that, after only a couple centuries of inquiry, science--methodological naturalism--has established an extraordinary degree of credibility that religion, after several millennia, has failed to attain.

Peter, I thank you for posting such a through and concise refutation to what was some very(purposely) confusing verbiage. You are correct that once all of the verbal judo is stripped away that; that we are indeed on quite familiar ground.

Plotinus, I'm sorry for having personally attacked you in my previous reply. I don't know as to whether or not you believe in evolution. I promise that I'll try to not be a bigot when talking with/commenting on you in the future. Anyways, besides all of my dumb junk...here's a suggestion for everyone: It seems that most of the people here disagree with Plotinus. Let's change that. Since Plotinus seems to be "the faith-y type", why don't we all invite similar minded people to come post in this forum, so that way the debates will be more well balanced, as opposed to it being 4 on 1.

Going back to the initial post in this thread, from Ryuzaki, regarding a potential "atheist rebuttal" to the "Cosmological Argument," I take a somewhat different approach than the others, except maybe Mark: the cosmological argument does not need "rebuttal," per se, but reframing. In service of statements about God, gods, or the supernatural (all of which I refer to below as "God" for the sake of simplicity), the cosmological argument is irrelevant.

First, both historically and in current practice, knowledge of God for practitioners of religion, including assertions regarding God's existence, characteristics, intentions, and so on (again, for simplicity, I will call this "theology"), is not derived from physics. No one, except perhaps a few philosophers and other intellectuals who are struggling to maintain religion in the face of other, nearly overwhelming doubts, worships a "First Cause." People pray to and worship agents who are active in the world, with intentions for human conduct, and the power to cause observable effects by unseen forces. Theologians and other professional practitioners do not conduct experiments to increase their knowledge of God, but perform operations of reason on various forms of "revelation," which are usually texts that claim to be and are accepted as messages from God.

Second, arguments like the "Cosmological Argument," devised by philosophers, or philosophically inclined theologians, are generally used only to demonstrate that physics is consonant with theology; the content of theology, for the purposes of most practitioners, is not derived from physics. While it may be true that religious people did not really begin to conceive of God as "transcending space and time" (i.e., as a "First Cause") until they had developed philosophical ideas and scientific knowledge about space and time, I challenge anyone to demonstrate how that changed the meaning of belief and practice for believers and practitioners.

For example, compare the first two verses of Genesis with the first five verses of John, both of which can be read without assuming that God technically "transcends space and time," and still make perfect sense in context. And the differences between the two texts probably reflects the fact that the Greeks came in between them and invented philosophy. Thus, while Genesis presupposes a "formless void" and "waters" situated in space and time, John suggests with a more philosophical flavor, probably to satisfy minds familiar with what the Greeks had achieved, that "All things came into being through God, and without him not one thing came into being." Christians read John to mean that the Word God is identical to the Creator God of Genesis--i.e., that the referent in Genesis was identical to the referent in John, and the reference only shifted from Creator God to Word God to "reveal" another aspect of the same entity. Since the gospels were probably intended as persuasive documents, John's argument about "the Word" was likely meant to address outsiders' ideas about God, rather than to change the insiders' ideas about God. In other words, "We worship the same God as always, but our God also encompasses your philosophical ideas about existence, so you might as well join up with us."

The "Cosmological Argument," as deployed by modern Christians, is clearly meant to do the same thing John was meant to do: convince outsiders that they should join up because their views do not conflict with those of Christianity. But asserting the consonance between theology and physics is not an argument in favor of theology, any more than saying that the consonance between the east-west alignment of my street and the direction of the earth's rotation constitutes a valid argument that planetary rotation directly caused my street to be so aligned. So what if I can keep my scientific understanding of the universe after I join your religion? I don't want to take up all the other ideas your religion requires!

Arguments like the "Cosmological Argument" only say, "Physics does not discount God." True enough. But physics also does not give rise to God. And saying that theology can accommodate physics suggests only that theology is flexible. If we could erase all the theology that has been developed throughout history, and leave ourselves only with the tools of physics, there is no reason to believe we would rebuild all the same assertions as before because physics does not yield the same content as "revelation."

To say it another way, even assuming that the Big Bang necessitates a First Cause that transcends space and time, it does not follow that the First Cause the Transcends Space and Time is equal to God, because God is an idea or a set of ideas that have developed throughout human history by reference to human experience, human desires, human history, and so on.

So when I encounter the "Cosmological Argument," I see no reason to dive into physics, to talk about what happened "before" the Big Bang, or get into philosophical categories of "things that begin to exist" and "things that do not." Regarding physics, as Mark said, "The most simple answer to what came before the Big Bang is, 'We don't know.' Put a period on that, and stop. That's all that is really required." Anyone is free to disagree with my assessment of the situation, of course, and I am interested in hearing why.

In short, the "Cosmological Argument" says only "physics does not rule out God"; it does not say "physics proves God." Moreover, the consonance between physics and theology, especially in light of the historical evolution of theology, supports only the inference that theology is flexible, not that it can be derived from physics. And it certainly does not support all the rest of the theological content that characterizes God.