In another thread, Ryuzaki asked whether it might be worthwhile to read Thomas Aquinas. I think it is worthwhile; he is interesting and I recommend reading him if you are up to a challenge. If you read the Summa Theologica, however, you should start at the beginning. I recommend going slowly, carefully, and without reading too much in from your other knowledge about religion or theology. You should also be familiar with the form he followed strictly, which is designed for teaching, one idea at a time, in segments called "articles."

First, the whole work is divided into parts, which are divided into "questions," which are divided into "articles," each of which begins with an actual question, e.g., "Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?" (That is the first question (or "article") in the Summa.)

Next, after each question, there will be some "objections." These represent the opposite of how he would answer the question. So, for example, here is the first objection to the first question:

"It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: 'Seek not the things that are too high for thee' (Sirach 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous."

Be careful with terms like "philosophical science." Remember that he wrote before the "Enlightenment," and before the development of science as we know it. So he was talking about ways that Plato and Aristotle studied the world, which we generally call "philosophy." Around the time Aquinas was writing, "science" just meant something like "knowledge acquired by study." So with that objection, he is invoking the view that what we can discern with our reason (e.g., in the Aristotelian fashion) is all the knowledge we need. And if you think the reason given for that objection--"man should not seek to know what is above reason," a kind of "forbidden knowledge" approach--does not reflect your view, then read the next objection:

"Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge."

In other words, what we can know with our reason--that "knowledge acquired by study"--is complete knowledge (or at least potentially complete knowledge) because reason reaches into everything that exists. So "further doctrine besides philosophy" that is "above reason" is unnecessary--why bother trying to know about what is beyond being? You might think (as I do) that this is a much stronger objection than the first.

Aquinas disagrees, first by citing an authority that some people might accept without further critical analysis:

"On the contrary, It is written (2 Timothy 3:16): 'All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.' Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God."

In other words, if you believe that scripture always leads the way, this "on the contrary" is enough for you and you agree with Aquinas that further doctrine besides philosophy (knowledge obtained by study and the exercise of reason) is required. But if you are not satisfied, he explains his own view:

I answer that, It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

There is a lot to chew through there, but again, be careful with words like "salvation," which did not have the same meaning for Aquinas as it has for, say, a modern evangelical fundamentalist. See, for example, the definition of salvation in the Catholic Encyclopedia, which does not jump, as modern evangelical fundamentalists do, to some eternal party of praise and worship in "heaven," but focuses instead on the process of submission to obtain "liberation from straitened circumstances or from other evils, and . . . a translation into a state of freedom and security."

(Note: I find it extremely difficult to read this stuff without running it through the lens of the late 20th century protestant evangelical tradition in which I was raised, but I think a fair reading requires me to put as much of that aside as possible. It would miss the point to criticize Aquinas for representing a set of commitments that he could not have been representing, since they came centuries later.)

Also, be careful with the word "God," which Aquinas addresses interestingly in Part I, Question 2, Articles 2 and 3, with his five famous "proofs" (in article 3)--which bear little if any resemblance to what appear to be currently popular conceptions of "God." Notice that each proof just describes some apparent aspect of existence and ends with a phrase like "and people call this God." We can "disprove" those arguments because they no longer represent our view of the universe (i.e., by saying, "the universe is not teleological, therefore the teleological proof fails"), but I think the more interesting approach is to note that Aquinas previously stated the following, in article 2 of the same question:

"I say that this proposition, 'God exists,' of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence[.]"

In other words, God and existence are the same thing, and identifying aspects of existence under the state of the "science" of his day amounts to "proof" that God exists, or that existence exists. There are other complications to the idea if you read more. I don't think Aquinas was trying to prove that any particular God "exists" in the sense that any object or body "exists" within the background of what we know as existence. I think he just was trying to show that there is such a background, that our sense of reality is what physicists might call "background-dependent," and the fact that we are background dependent means there is a background, which, as Aquinas might say, is what people call God. And, of course, as an atheist, you simply cannot respond to that sort of assertion the same way you might respond to a modern fundamentalist who, by "God," is talking about some personified force, some imaginary Big Man.

At any rate, finally, each article finishes with specific replies to the objections, based on the body of Aquinas' view as expressed in the middle segment that beings with "I answer that."

I think the best way to approach Aquinas is to begin by throwing out your religious vocabulary because it is almost certainly tainted by developments that came later. When Aquinas talks about "divine revelation," don't think about Moses on the mountain receiving the Ten Commandments, or angels of the lord appearing to shepherds, and so on. That's not the kind of thing he's talking about; it's much more in the vein of what we would call "philosophical." And if you, as an atheist, have interacted with Catholics who take their system seriously and actually think about it (not just the ones who show up for mass every week, then go out and live like the rest of us), then you know that this philosophical approach is the one they usually take.

But I should also say that reading Aquinas is maddening. Despite his thoroughness, it often feels like he is running in circles, and not following the logical progression that makes the most sense (to me, at least). For example, I would think that he should first establish whether anything we call God is worth talking about, then explain "divine revelation," and go from there. But he doesn't. And most of his arguments address a world that did not know the kinds of things we know today. You have to strip about 800 years off your knowledge of the world if you want to read him fairly, in context.

Since it seems that Aquinas would say, "God is existence itself" that leads me to ask:

When he says this, does he mean a Hindu-like concept (God is existence itself, there are no separate entities, ones that are not apart of the "fabric" of the universe) or does he mean that there still is a separate entity that is like the fundamentalist concept that you called, "The Big Man?"

Also, I think that in Hinduism it is possible for God to be both "existence itself," and a separate, or independent entity at the same time, like say, an incarnation of Shiva or Vishnu.

But the reason why I deemed the first definition as being "Hindu-like" is because within that religion, technically one can both be an atheist and go to heaven after they die, because I think that in Hinduism, one is guaranteed entry to heaven as long as they "stay true to, or follow their dharma (their path, their belief system) in life." And if a Hindu believes that God is only existence itself, doesn't that make them a functional atheist?

It seems that the eastern religions are inclined towards atheism. But in Buddhism, and possibly in Hinduism as well, there is a belief in an "ultimate reality". I think that this belief is what makes Theravada Buddhism in the very least to be considered a religion.

Mahayana Buddhism (the other major denomination of Buddhism) with its less strict interpretation of The Buddha's writings, may be practiced as polytheism more or less in some parts of Asia, so I don't know whether or not it could be considered to possess the same degree of atheistic inclination as its counterpart, Theravada Buddhism.

But anyways, the point of the above paragraph was to ask whether or not retaining the belief in an ultimate reality would negate one from being in the very least a functional atheist, or an atheist at all.

In "Western" religions like Christianity (which started in the East, too), defining "God" to be synonymous with "existence" tends to happen with academic theologians who need to explain why they talk about "God," but without making the obvious error of turning "God" into something less than everyone knows "God" must be if "God" is worth talking about. Whether "Eastern" religions are doing the same thing is debatable.

But if "God" is no different than "existence," or whatever universal background in which everything takes its being, then there is little reason to talk about "God" at all. Before she went completely nuts, Karen Armstrong wrote A History of God and The Battle for God, which describe how religions have changed over time. People start to talk about God, but then the logical inconsistencies bother them, so they refine and redefine the concept until "God" becomes completely abstract, nothing more than a cipher for existence itself. But ordinary people--i.e., the ones who aren't interested in thinking carefully--find little comfort in the abstraction, so they bring "God" back down into the contradictory range of being merely an imaginary, superhuman being.

The problem is that, among the people who call themselves "Christian" or "religious," you can find people with an abstract notion of "God"--they are just atheists who use a different vocabulary--and fervent practitioners who don't care about contradictions. The fervent practitioners are the ones who cause all the problems, use religion as an excuse to behave badly, and generally annoy the rest of us, but the ones with the abstract notions, while they are philosophically and practically almost indistinguishable from irreligious people or even outright atheists, sit at the top of the religious hierarchy and feed complicated theology down to the fervent practitioners--as Thomas Aquinas did, and is still doing today. What those people with the abstract notions ought to be doing, in the words they would use, is taking a "prophetic" role--challenging people's ideas and beliefs about God. Instead, they leave that to the atheists.

That's why I think it's important for atheists to spend more time studying what people really say and believe about God, from the abstract theologians at the top of the heap, all the way down to the people in the street. Instead, what I see from a lot of atheists is a focus on the people in the street--mostly because that's what we used to be. So when atheists go around criticizing beliefs and ideas that the practically-atheist theologians already know are problematic, those theologians say to themselves, and to their people, "Look, we know about those problems, and we have already addressed them, hundreds if not thousands of years ago, and still we are here. So put that in your pipe and smoke it." Then they go back to their privately-held abstract notions and continue leading the fervent practitioners around by the nose, doling out just enough idiocy to keep them happy.

Which means, in short, that the real problem is not that the content of religion is ludicrous--even lots of religious people will admit that--but that some people want ludicrous content (a unique problem) and that others are willing to provide it (another unique problem).

In regard to studying what the abstract theologians have to say, I admit I haven't been doing any of that lately.

Instead, I'm still reading the Koran and learning more about Islam. Anyone else studying any of the non-Christian religions?

Although I've read the entire Bible, there's still so much to learn just about the religions of Judaism and Christianity themselves, in regard to all of the different denominations and sects within them.

In regard to Karen Armstrong, I saw her on t.v. the other day, on CNN, when their special entitled, "Faith and Money in America" came on.

She was on for only like 30 seconds, but I thought that what she had to say was interesting nonetheless. Did you happen to catch that Peter?

Also, when she "went nuts" as you said, did she have a stroke? When she was talking it sounded like she had had one. Oh wait, never mind, that was a British accent.

Regarding "went nuts," I mean her most recent book, The Case for God, which I am currently reading. Best I can tell, her argument boils down to this: "Religious rituals and practices are important because people need a way to interact with the ultimate, which is what they call 'God', and they should do it by the patterns established in the existing religious traditions." Or, "Be religious because your ancestors were religious. Trust me, you'll like it." How that is much different from somebody like Rick Warren saying something like, "Have faith and God will give you faith--then join up with my religion and adopt our viewpoints," I am not sure. Armstrong is just doing liberal apologetics.